



A TERRITORIAL COMMUNITY AS A PARADIGM?

Urmas Arumäe

*Estonian Business School, Lauteri 3, 10114 Tallinn, Estonia
E-mail: urmas.arumae@ebs.ee*

Received 20 February 2009; accepted 27 November 2009

Abstract. In this article, the author provides a cursory introduction of the idea to base the interpretation of the functional mechanisms of territorial communities on Kuhn's treatment of the paradigms of scientific communities. According to the author's interpretation and treatment, territorial communities are human associations that are related to self-organizing territories, the sequence of timely states, which are being called a process. From this, it ensues that a territorial community is a process. Based on the author's position and the context of territorial communities, paradigms can be explained as follows: the paradigms of territorial communities determine the important objects with which the community deals and the related problems and/or questions that are established and the methods whereby these problems and/or questions are resolved.

Keywords: territorial community, paradigm, anomaly, crisis, revolutions, developmental states (preliminary, ordinary and subsequent states).

TERITORINĖ BENDRUOMENĖ KAIP PARADIGMA

Urmas Arumäe

*Estijos verslo mokykla, Lauteri 3, 10114 Talinas, Estija
El. paštas urmas.arumae@ebs.ee*

Įteikta 2009-02-20; priimta 2009-11-27

Santrauka. Šiame straipsnyje autorius pateikia samprotavimus siekdamas pagrįsti teritorinių bendruomenių funkcijas pagal Kuhno socialinės bendruomenės paradigmos suvokimą. Anot autoriaus, teritorinės bendruomenės yra žmonių asociacijos, kurios susietos savivaldos teritorijomis, būsėnų laike seka, kuri vadinama procesu. Dėl to galima teigti, kad teritorinė bendruomenė nuolat vystosi. Remiantis autoriaus pozicija ir teritorinės bendruomenės kontekstu, paradigmos gali būti aiškinamos taip: teritorinės bendruomenės paradigmos nustato svarbius jai objektus ir su jais susijusias problemas bei metodus, kurie leidžia išspręsti bendruomenės problemas.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: teritorinė bendruomenė, paradigma, anomalija, krizė, revoliucijos, raidos būsenos (preliminari, įprasta ir vėlesnė).

1. Introduction

According to the author's interpretation, a territorial community is a constant and developing process, which has no objective outside itself. A territorial community can be compared to a religious community, for instance, or with S. Kuhn's scientific community.

In his famous essay, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn has called the structures of scientific inquiry *paradigms*. By this he means generally recognized scientific achievements that provide examples for communities of experts in identifying and resolving problems (Kuhn 2003).

The object and purpose of this article, as established by the author, is to search for support in Kuhn's paradigms for the philosophical interpretation and epistemological description of the functional mechanisms of territorial communities, and to see whether Kuhn's treatment of paradigms can, in principle, be expanded to include territorial communities; all the more because Kuhn himself draws parallels between changes in political and scientific paradigms (Kuhn 2003). The author poses the exploratory question of whether territorial communities can be treated as paradigms and whether the author's interpretation that territorial communities are directed by paradigms is justified. The answer to the former question is negative, and affirmative for the latter.

The method that was used is theory and the comparative analysis of the author's positions, as well as modeling. The primary reference work is the aforementioned essay by Kuhn.

The author has also followed the criticisms of Kuhn's approach that have been penned by British philosopher K. R. Popper (1999) and philosophy professor J. Watkins (1999) the student and colleague of the former from the London School of Economics.

As a result of the theoretical interpretation in this article, the author has compiled a model of the developmental stages affected by the paradigms of territorial communities as processes, i.e. a general picture of how the author has dealt with territorial communities as processes and the paradigms that are their influencers. Further elaboration of the issues dealt with in this article can be found in the author's corresponding research paper.

2. Territorial community – process or paradigm?

Since 1974 many studies have been conducted on different types of communities (territorial, work and school communities, interest and values communities, etc.) and many questionnaires have been developed to measure sense of community (Prezza *et al.* 2009).

McMillan (1986) defined sense of community as “*a feeling that members have of belonging, a feeling that members matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith*

that members' needs will be met through their commitment to be together.” McMillan and Chavis (1986) identified four dimensions that constitute sense of community (membership, influence, shared emotional connection, and needs fulfillment) and that interact dynamically to create and maintain it.

There are several instruments available to measure sense of community. Just to mention two of them: the Sense of Community Index-short form (SCI) (Perkins *et al.* 1990), and the Perceived Sense of Community Scale (PSCS) (Bishop, Chertok and Jason 1997). A recent study was designed to validate a new Multidimensional Territorial Sense of Community Scale (MTSOCS) based on McMillan and Chavis's theory (Prezza *et al.* 2009).

According to the author's interpretation and treatment, territorial communities (villages, rural municipalities, towns, and the historical settlement of cities) are processes. A cursory explanation of the author's approach follows.

Territorial communities are in a constant state of development, or process, without having any objectives outside themselves. Here the author refers to the Lithuanian philosopher A. Maceina, according to whom territorial communities lack objectives outside themselves – **communities just have an idea, which they realize with their own existence** (Maceina 1990). The internal objectives are related to satisfying the needs of their members. The development of territorial communities in Estonia confirms that despite various foreign occupations that destroyed the country, as well as devastating epidemics and wars that destroyed entire villages, the drive for social cohabitation, or the habit of living together communally, has survived from ancient times to the present day.

Today a question may arise of whether territorial communities are even viable. The results of R. S. Oropesa's study support the view of the local community as a viable, specialized entity in modern society. Communities remain viable because they are organized to serve the instrumental needs of specific segments of the population. As predicted by the community of limited liability model, participation in local associations is structured around the life cycle and other investment characteristics of residents (Oropesa 1987). The fact that territorial communities could be treated as processes is also recognized by G. Morgan, when he writes that *by treating an organization's activities as a rational and technical process,¹ the mechanical figurative system tends to diminish the human aspects of organizations and to ignore the fact that assignments facing organizations are often much more complicated, vaguer and more difficult than the majority of operations executed by machines* (Morgan 1997).

¹ That is, organizations, which include territorial corporate bodies, can be considered processes but not only technical processes.

Having received confirmation from the aforementioned, the author has taken the position that **a territorial community is a self-regulating human association connected to a territory and its sequence of time-related states is called a process. It follows that a territorial community is a process – whether it can be managed or not and by whom or what it can be managed is a separate issue.**

As the figure below shows, this process has a beginning, evolution, and termination or end point (see the dashed arrow). This applies if adaption to new “revolutionary” changes in the paradigm is not achieved or for other reasons (such as the dying out/destruction of all the members of the community). Otherwise (the dashed arrow in the figure), the process evolves and questions recede into the changes in the paradigm.

Kuhn does not equate the scientific community with scientific paradigm. The author also does not plan to equate territorial communities or their paradigms. A paradigm is a “certain way of seeing the world”, which once accepted by a number of scientists creates a community from these scientists; or a religious community from believers; or a territorial community from the people living on a certain territory.

Instead of paradigms, the scientific philosopher Feyerabend speaks about ideologies, which should be treated as substantively similar to paradigms. Feyerabend considers science to be an ideology alongside many others and also differentiates various ideologies within science.

The aforementioned has also answered the question of whether a territorial community is a paradigm – the answer is negative.

3. Could a (territorial) community be managed by a paradigm?

The Greek word *παράδειγμα* (*paradigm*) means example. The original definition of paradigm was an example that served as a model, a standard, epitome or prototype. Today, this word is used as a term in several fields of activity. In rhetoric, a paradigm or example is understood to mean an instructive story told in the course of argumentation. In the history of science, a paradigm is defined as a constant and generally recognized system of concepts, laws and methods, on which the practice of scientific examination and teaching of science is based. In his concept of the philosophy of science, Kuhn started to define a paradigm as a method of conducting science that is acquired by example. In popular language, the word has started to denote a framework of thought or way of doing things in some field of activity.

Kuhn came to understand that traditional scientific interpretations, which are related to inductive concepts or falsification, do not correspond to reality. Thus, Kuhn tried to create his own scientific theory to be in greater conformity with scientific development as he saw it. Kuhn's theory

is characterized by a special emphasis on the revolutionary character of scientific progress; *in this context, revolution means the abandonment of an established theoretical structure and its replacement with a new one that is not related to the former* (Chalmers 1998). A second important feature is the significant role played by the sociological characteristics of the scientific circles.

Based on Kuhn's definition, the paradigms of a scientific community should be interpreted as general theoretical assumptions and laws, as well as their means of implementation, which are used by the members of the corresponding scientific community that shapes and develops the paradigm with its activities. *Kuhn calls activities of the people that work within the framework of the paradigm normal science* (Chalmers 1998).

Based on the author's interpretation, every community has its own paradigms, the ingredients of which are its set system and customs, as well as recorded standards, convictions, dogmas, historical experience, but also its actual states and common goals. Paraphrasing what Kuhn has written about the scientific community, by examining and practicing these customs, experiences and other aforementioned factors, the members of the corresponding community learn their roles, which are passed down from generation to generation or from older members to younger ones. These are the common bases in the corresponding community. The members of the community base their actions on the examples of others, which they have acquired from the experiences transferred to them as well as from written sources (and from here Kuhn continues with the words) *often without knowing or needing to know what characteristics have been bestowed on these examples by the status of the paradigms adopted by the community*. This learning and teaching process evolves throughout the life of the community members. **Paradigms can occur earlier, and be more binding and complete than any other sets of rules**² (the author's emphasis), *that might be unambiguously derived from them* (Kuhn 2003).

Based on the idea of the definition borrowed from Kuhn by the author, a paradigm of a territorial community should be interpreted as general theoretical assumptions and laws (including practices) and their means of implementation that are used by the members of the corresponding territorial community that shape and develop the paradigm with its activities.

M. Polanyi has also written about the teaching of scientific philosophy based on traditions and example in his book *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (Polanyi 1974 and 2004). A simplified explanation is that Polanyi's idea was to transfer the concepts of master and

² “Research regulations” in Kuhn's text.

apprentice from handicraft and art to science. Polanyi acknowledged the role of inherited practices (traditions). The following idea originated with Polanyi: “The fact that we know more than we are able to express, leads to the conclusion that a great deal of knowledge is transferred to the “apprentice” implicitly, as the latter observes the activities of the master and practices under his direction.”

Based on a private philosophy-related conversation with Eintalu³, paradigms in the context of territorial communities could summarily be explained as follows: **the paradigms of a territorial community determine the important objects that the community deals with, along with the related problems and/or questions and the resolutions provided for these problems and/or questions.**

A territorial community as process cannot be managed by the managers chosen to do so. Actually, the members of a territorial community do not choose managers, but representative(s) – the latter in turn hire servants/employees and organizers for the community, not managers. Based on the author’s interpretation, a **territorial community is managed (influenced) by paradigms**, by direct example or separate rules, thereby generating changes in the community.

Based on the aforementioned, the author takes the position that the influencers of territorial communities are paradigms, which, paraphrasing Kuhn, includes **the general achievements of communal development that provide the members of the community with an example for determining and resolving problems for a certain period of time.**

Here it is appropriate to introduce parallels with religious communities or political parties, where the community is also managed (influenced) by paradigms, not by bishops or party secretaries – without disparaging the role of the latter. P. Feyerabend also compares religious and scientific ideologies in his book *Science in a Free Society* (Feyerabend 1978). According to Feyerabend, the difference between science and voodoo or religions is not in methods but in objectives.

The contemporary sociology of religion observes a change in the paradigm of religion and the treatment of religion, asserting among other things that the master narrative in the old paradigm of sociology of religion is “linear secularization” while in the new paradigm it is “revival and routinization”. S. W. Goldstein (2009) presents the corresponding treatment.

We should also mention that the trends and events of global change, and increasingly available information, have resulted in a new understanding of world affairs that also impacts the community paradigm. According to J. Pugh, in the last few decades there has been a spatial turn in thin-

king in the social sciences and humanities. The spatial turn is a paradigm shift in outlook and perspective, extending far beyond the academic discipline of ‘geography’. These include climate change, the worldwide disaggregation of international production processes, global human rights, liberal democracy promotion, fair trade, imperialism, post-colonialism, genetically modified (GM) foods, Iraq, indigenous peoples, Afghanistan, the cyclone that devastated Burma, and the earthquake that hit China in 2008. In all cases, the spatial is increasingly seen as a something that is more than a predefined territorial container of political life (Pugh 2009).

The success of the community depends on people and social capital, among other things. According to E. Humphreys, the most enthusiastic proponents of social capital identify it as the key explanatory factor in economically prosperous and well-governed territorial communities. The tendency is to reduce the concept to the ‘sense of community’ and voluntary association (Humphreys 2007).

One must not forget the macroeconomic processes that are influenced by the government and competition as factors impacting paradigms. V. Navickas and A. Malakauskaite directed our attention to the fact that the impact of government on macroeconomic processes is quite relevant. It manifests itself through various functions of governance and administration. The main mission of governing bodies is to assure economic and political stability. Modern economic policy is based on the concept of clusters (Navickas and Malakauskaite 2008). R. Ginevičius and V. Podvezko argue that when a country’s economy is being restructured, the differences in the economic and social development of various regions become more prominent. To smooth these differences, a number of scientific and practical problems associated with the concepts of regions, regional policies and their aims, the determination of a region’s boundaries, and evaluation of its development, etc., should be thoroughly investigated. To solve such complicated problems, evaluation methods based on multiple criteria have to be used, which also take into consideration the major aspects of the economic and social development in the regions (Ginevičius and Podvezko 2009). A. V. Rutkauskas has analyzed the methodical and practical aspects of a country’s (region’s) competitiveness, sustainable development strategy and means of implementation and found that success in risk management should be a factor of the highest importance for tackling the issue of the sustainability of the country’s (*i.e.* territorial communities – author’s remark) competitiveness development (Rutkauskas 2008).

If we were to ask how, for instance, territorial, scientific, or religious communities differ, then without descending into an in-depth analysis, the author can state that the main difference is in the paradigms and direction of its objectives (inwards or outwards) – territorial commu-

³ EBS Lecturer of Philosophy Jüri Eintalu, PhD.

nities are also differentiated by territorial principles and circumstances (a proposition that the author arrived at in the course of his research) and that territorial communities are not organizations (in the case of scientific communities, it is also not always, if at all, possible to speak of a uniform organization). The differences in departing from various communities should also be pointed out: if a member of the community leaves a territorial community (for instance moves elsewhere), he or she is no longer a member of that community; if a scientist leaves a scientific community or a believer a religious community, they must abandon the corresponding paradigms. Scientific, political and religious communities differ, but are significantly closer to each other than territorial communities are to either of them. *Ad hoc* conclusion – **various types of communities are substantively different.**

If we were to ask how the paradigms of territorial, scientific or religious communities differ, then without descending into an in-depth analysis, the author concludes that paradigms as the way of doing something, which are acquired based on example in any field of activity or as a framework of thought or as general theoretical assumptions and laws (including practices), are formally characteristic of every community. The substantive differences between paradigms result from differences between the communities. *Ad hoc* conclusion – **the paradigms of various types of communities are substantively similar.**

Answering the question of whether and by who or what a territorial community can be managed, the author takes the position that **territorial communities are processes that cannot be managed by elected or hired leaders, but which are managed (influenced) by the community's paradigms, which are in turn constantly changing.**

4. Changes in paradigms

Of course, all the members of a community do not always agree about everything. This would be unreasonable. Even more, one must take the position that a community has various paradigms; whereas smaller “partial paradigms” may exist inside the paradigms (compare this to the above interpretation by Feyerabend related to the internal ideologies of ideology). What Kuhn writes about the scientific community may leave the impression that a community⁴ is a single monolithic and unified undertaking that must survive or collapse along with any of its paradigms, or with all of them together. But a community⁵ is probably seldom or never like this (Kuhn 2003).

The existing situation is usually tolerated while the paradigms or examples seem firm. Based on Kuhn's treatment of

paradigms in the scientific community, *they may agree on the identification of the paradigm, without agreeing with its total interpretation or rational formulation [rationalization] or even attempting to do so. The lack of a standard interpretation, or differences related to the issue of the withdrawal of rules, does not prevent the paradigms from managing* (Kuhn 2003) the development of the community. Until paradigms are securely in place, they may also function without unanimity related to their rational formulations or without any attempt to rationally formulate them (Kuhn 2003).

But how do changes in paradigms occur? Paraphrasing Kuhn, the changes are not independent events, but long episodes with regular repetitive structures. Discovery starts with the recognition of an anomaly, continues with the investigation of the anomaly's domain and does not end until new knowledge corresponding to the paradigm⁶ is adapted, so that the anomalous phenomenon becomes the expected norm.

As the author has recognized in the course of his research, we can never know precisely when territorial community began and we assume that its demise will never arrive. We live from moment to moment thinking that we can influence the change of the system's current state (for instance, by managing processes) into a desired state. Such a change is possible through changes in paradigms, the beginnings of which cannot be predetermined. The author gets encouragement for this treatment and interpretation from Kuhn's interpretation, when he writes that *any attempt to determine the date of a discovery within these or similar limits must inevitably be arbitrary, because the discovery of a new type of phenomenon is definitely a complex event that comprises the recognition that something exists, as well as what it is* (Kuhn 2003). Based on the author's interpretation, Kuhn's statement is also applied to the “date” of a community's origin.

Failures may also be starting points for anomalies that in turn create backgrounds for the discovery of something new. It is impossible to say precisely when the discovery that discovers a new phenomenon occurs. Kuhn provides the following characteristics: *prior awareness of the anomaly, the step-by-step and simultaneous emergence of this recognition, and the subsequent changes in the paradigm categories and procedures often encounter resistance* (Kuhn 2003), *i.e.* in the case of the latter, the community's ability to adapt is important.

Here, we might ask, which states of consciousness are the given discoveries based on? Osho⁷ (2009) has divided

⁴ Here, Kuhn means the scientific community and uses the definition “normal science”.

⁵ “Science” in Kuhn's text.

⁶ “Theory” in Kuhn's text.

⁷ Born Chandra Mohan Jain (11 December 1931 – 19 January 1990). Since the 1960s, also known as Acharya Rajneesh. In the 1970s and 80s, he called himself Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh. In 1989, he took the name of Osho. Was an Indian mystic and spiritual teacher, as well as a philosophy professor.

the stages of consciousness in three: the lowest stage is instinct, the middle stage is intellect and the highest stage is intuition. Do the changes in communal paradigms result from instinct, intellect or intuition, or from consciousness as a whole? Can we, and if so, at what stage, can we talk about the collective consciousness or collective instinct, collective intellect or collective intuition in the context of a communal paradigm shift? Epistemologically, the author does not preclude the possibility of “collective consciousness, since C. G. Jung’s (1995) “collective subconscious” as a psychological term is viable and denotes the hereditary stratification of humankind’s past experience, which is stored in everyone’s subconscious as archetypes or symbolic images and myths, which may rise to the surface with great emotional effectiveness during times of crisis, and to signal our fate. According to S. Blackburn (2002), consciousness is supposed to be the most fundamental fact that we come in connect with (in philosophy), although it is almost impossible to say what this is and problems that develop do not seem to be scientific in nature.

New discoveries and ideas in a community are not the only source of destructive-constructive changes therein. According to Kuhn, crises are the stage of change that follows discovery. As long as a paradigm’s methods (or tools) turn out to be capable of resolving its defined problems or questions, a community develops efficiently and effectively. The reason is clear. *Just like in industrial production, so too in science (so too in communities – the author), the replacement of tools is perceived as waste, and this action is postponed until absolutely necessary. Crises are important because they give notice that it is time to replace the tools* (Kuhn 2003).

The next question is how to regulate the crisis. According to Kuhn, crises comprise the necessary preconditions for the development of a new theory (including a new idea – the author). Although one may lose faith in the state of long-lasting anomalies and consider possible alternatives (and here I continue with Kuhn’s words), *the paradigm that has led to the crisis is not renounced*. Kuhn adds that if something has already achieved the status of a paradigm, it will be declared invalid only if a replacement candidate already exists to replace it. ... *The decision to abandon a paradigm always means the simultaneous acceptance of another, and the making of this decision is always accompanied by the comparison of both paradigms with nature and each other* (Kuhn 2003).

If an anomaly causes a crisis, it must be something more than just an anomaly. Making a paradigm compatible with nature or the state of the community is always difficult, but the majority of them are eliminated sooner or later; often as the result of process that could not be predicted. Kuhn has written that if an anomaly *starts to seem like something more than just another enigma in the community*⁸, the

transition to a crisis (and revolutionary change) has begun (Kuhn 2003).

The transition to crisis from an existing paradigm to a new one, from which a new tradition for the community may develop, *is far from a cumulative process that may be executed based on the articulation or expansion of the old paradigm. ... During the transition period, problems that can be resolved with the help of the old and new paradigm overlap to a great extent, but never totally. ... Once the transition has been completed, the corresponding community⁹ has changed its view of its object¹⁰, its methods and objectives* (Kuhn 2003).

We have arrived at revolutionary change in paradigms. Kuhn also asks why a change in a paradigm should be called a revolution and starts searching for parallels between political, or at certain levels between communal and scientific, revolutions.

Political revolutions get started from a deepening feeling usually prevalent among a narrow sector of the political public that the existing institutions have ceased to adequately deal with problems that are created by a situation that has partially been caused by these same institutions. According to Kuhn, scientific revolutions can also get started from a *deepening feeling, which again is limited to a narrow subgroup in the scientific community, that the existing paradigm has stopped functioning adequately in the researching of some aspect of nature, to which this same paradigm has previously shown the way*. In both political and scientific development, a feeling of inadequate functioning, which can lead to a crisis, is a necessary precondition for revolution. An important comment to add here is that changes in society will only seem revolutionary to those (henceforth in Kuhn’s words), *whose paradigms are affected. To bystanders they may seem like a normal part of the developmental process, like the Balkan wars at the beginning of the 20th century* (Kuhn 2003).

Kuhn’s subsequent interpretation of political revolution is as follows: *The goal of political revolution is to change political institutions in a manner that these institutions prohibit. Therefore, the abandonment of one set of institutions in favor of another is necessary; however, in the meanwhile, there are no institutions to rule the society* (The author believes that Kuhn’s statement applies to political revolutions that change the organization of a state). *At first, there is only a crisis that weakens the role of the political institutions. A growing number of people become increasingly alienated from political life and start acting ever more strangely therein. Thereafter, when the crisis deepens, many of them tie themselves to some*

⁸ “Normal science” in Kuhn’s text.

⁹ “Scientific community” in Kuhn’s text.

¹⁰ “Specialized” in Kuhn’s text.

specific proposals for the reconstruction of the society within a new institutional framework. At this moment, society is divided into warring factions or political parties; some try to protect the aggregate of old institutions, while the others strive to establish a new one (A typical situation, for instance, during elections – the author). And once such a polarization has developed, political measures no longer function (In the democratic elections phase, these may still function, but will no longer function if the “masses have been called to arms” – the author). Since the parties in a revolutionary conflict diverge in regards to fundamental institutional principles on which the political change is to be achieved and assessed is based because they do not recognize any authority higher than these institutions to make the decisions regarding the differences of opinion, they must finally look for help in the persuasion of the masses, which is often accompanied by violence. Although revolutions have played an important role in the development of political institutions, the nature of their role depends on whether the events partially exist outside of politics or institutions (Kuhn 2003). Just like the choice between warring political institutions, so too the choice between warring paradigms may turn out to be a choice between incompatible convictions that reign in the life of a community, and therefore, it is inappropriate to equate political revolution and the revolutionary changes in a community's paradigms. Kuhn adds that *just as in political revolution, there is no higher standard in the choice of paradigm than the approval of the concerned community* (author's emphasis).

We should point out that no paradigm can solve all the problems that it raises, and that neither old or new paradigms will leave the same problems unresolved, which is why Kuhn (2003) says that *paradigm debates include only one question – the solution of which problems is more important?*

Watkins's (1999) highlights Kuhn and Popper's different understanding of revolution, when he writes that Popper has recommended the following slogan for science: *Revolution in permanence!*¹¹, while he credits Kuhn with the maxim: *Not nostrums but normalcy!*¹² He adds that *what is genuinely scientific for Kuhn is hardly science for Popper and what is genuinely scientific for Popper is hardly science for Kuhn* (Watkins 1999). The asymmetric position of these two great men can be used to perfectly characterize possible asymmetric situations and/or states in communities, which may result in anomalies, crises and situation-based revolutionary changes in paradigms.

Watkins emphasizes that a typical paradigm cycle comprises a *prolonged ordinary state*¹³ that leads the way to a short

and hectic revolutionary round, which is followed by a new ordinary state (Watkins 1999). The author's position is that these cycles cannot alternate without the transition periods that the author also shows in his model below.

Watkins criticizes Kuhn in several episodes, but here we emphasize Watkins's (1999) position that *Kuhn sees an analogy between the scientific community and the religious community and sees science as the scientists' religion*. Moreover, if this is true, Watkins asks *why normal science is elevated over extraordinary science*.¹⁴ He also criticizes Kuhn's approach based on the example of one original scientist who brings forth a new paradigm. Based thereon, Watkins states that *a new paradigm can never appear from normal science* (or an ordinary state – the author) *as it is characterized by Kuhn* (Watkins 1999). The author does not totally agree with Watkins on the point. The author's position is that the role of the individual is definitely important, and something must develop in the head of someone for the first time. At the same time, flashes of such ideas by the authors will not bring about changes in the community paradigm without the approval of the (majority) of the community. At the same time, one must take the position that Watkins did not directly say so and his statement should be treated as *reductio ad absurdum*, in order to show the value of some of Kuhn's positions.

Watkins (1999) criticizes Kuhn's paradigm change phase and describes it “independently of Kuhn” as the thesis of five paradigm changes. These are the Paradigm-Monopoly, No-Interregnum, Incompatibility, Gestalt-Switch and Instant-Paradigm theses. Summarizing this, what we can conclude from Watkins is that paradigms are resistant to change and do not tolerate rivals; that a power vacuum does not develop between old and new paradigms; that new and old paradigms are not compatible; that a new paradigm does not replace an old one in stages but with a gestalt switch; and a new paradigm has no preliminary story – it is relatively drastic. A new paradigm must be sufficiently authoritative right from the start in order to challenge a dominant paradigm.

Popper (1999) finds that Kuhn's normal science approach may be very suited to astronomy, but not to the evolution of the theory of matter. This may be true in the context of a scientific community, and the author has no good reason to argue with Popper. However, the author hopes to find suitable references in Kuhn's treatment of paradigms for the epistemological description of territorial community paradigms.

In his criticism of Kuhn's scientific revolution, Popper introduces the significance of the dogmatism concept and the role of dogmatic scientists by Kuhn, and differs with Kuhn in regard to this question (Popper 1999). From this,

¹¹ *Revolution in permanence!*

¹² *Not nostrums but normalcy!*

¹³ “Normal science” in Watkins's text.

¹⁴ Extraordinary science is defined as revolutionary, i.e. paradigm-changing, science.

one must conclude that a paradigm, especially paradigms based on very dogmatic bases, are not and cannot be very receptive to criticism, or let themselves be intimidated by the first anomaly that is encountered, which is why the road to a crisis, and no less a revolutionary change, is not always very smooth.

Popper (1999), like Watkins (1999), stresses that *an intellectual revolution often resembles a religious conversion. The new reference (or ideas – the author) may strike us like a lightning bolt. However, this does not mean that we are not able to critically and rationally assess our previous views in a new light.* Thereby, Popper alludes to the fact that he does not agree with Kuhn's interpretation.

5. Explanation of the model

Based on the figure below, if we move clockwise from the beginning of the process (at the bottom center of the circle) and assess the stages related to the paradigm, we must first emphasize a certain period of adaptation at the beginning of the process, which results in the “pre” or **preliminary state**. The evolutionary development of the new paradigm takes us to the “*hic et nunc*”¹⁵ stage, or **ordinary state**.

Chalmers has summarily explained Kuhn's picture of scientific evolution with the following scheme: *preliminary science – normal science – crisis – new normal science – new crisis* (Chalmers 1998). From the author's viewpoint, the same logic applies to territorial communities in the context of paradigms. Therefore, it is possible and actually natural that crises as well as (revolutionary) changes (even the election of local government councils or village elders, which may be accompanied by crises or result in significant, including revolutionary, changes). This in turn brings us to the “*post*”¹⁶ or **subsequent state**, which is followed by an adaptation period, and once this is successful, the process evolves and a new round begins. If the adaptation to a new and decisive paradigm is not successful, it may cause the termination of the community as the process (here, the example of elections is not appropriate, more appropriate is a change in governmental regime, or the dying out of a small rural municipality or village, etc.).

At this point, it should be emphasized that revolutionary change does not necessary mean a change for the worse. What is considered bad by someone is a matter of opinion and a separate subject. In the aforementioned context, constructive developments are intended.

6. Conclusions

Kuhn does not equate scientific communities and scientific paradigms. The author also does not do so in the case of

territorial communities and their paradigms. A paradigm is a “certain way of seeing the world”, which once accepted by a number of scientists creates a community from these scientists; or a religious community from believers; or a territorial community from the people living on a certain territory.

According to the definition borrowed from Kuhn by the author, a paradigm of a territorial community should be interpreted as general theoretical assumptions and laws (including practices) and their means of implementation that are used by the members of the corresponding territorial community that shape and develop the paradigm with its activities.

Based on the approach in this article, paradigms in the context of territorial communities can be explained as follows: the paradigms of a territorial community determine the important objects that the community deals with, along with the related problems and/or questions and the resolutions provided for these problems and/or questions.

Based on the author's interpretation, territorial communities are human associations that are related to self-organizing territories, the sequence of timely states of which is called a process. From this, it ensues that a territorial community is a process. A separate issue is whether it can be managed or not; and by whom or what it can be managed. In this article, the author found the following answer: territorial communities as processes cannot be managed by the leaders elected to do so. Based on the author's interpretation, a territorial community is managed (influenced) by the territorial community's paradigms by direct example or separate rules, thereby generating changes in the community and itself being in a constant state of change.

Based on the above, the author takes the summary position that the influencers of territorial communities are paradigms which, paraphrasing Kuhn, are the general achievements of communal development that provide the members of the community with an example for determining and resolving problems for a certain period of time. In the article, the author takes the position that various types of communities are substantively different and that the paradigms of various types of communities are substantively similar.

Kuhn's picture of scientific evolution is summarily explained by Chalmers in the following scheme: *preliminary science – normal science – crisis – new normal science – new crisis*. According to the model proposed by the author, a certain period of adaptation must be emphasized at the beginning of the process, which results in the *preliminary state*. The evolutionary development of the new paradigm takes us to the *ordinary state*. This in turn brings us to the *subsequent state*, which is followed by another adaptation period, and once this is successfully completed, the process evolves and a new round begins.

¹⁵ *Hic et nunc* (Latin), here and now.

¹⁶ *Post-* (< Latin *post* after), after, being, subsequent.

Changes in a community's paradigms are accompanied by changes in the developmental process of the territorial community, and are therefore important influences of the process.




Fig. The paradigmatic development stages of territorial communities as processes.

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